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Abstract 
 
Each generation of digital innovation has caused a 
dramatic change in the way people work. Sharing 
economy is the latest trend of digital innovation, and it 
has fundamentally changed the traditional business 
models. In this paper, we empirically examine the 
impacts of the sharing economy platforms (specifically, 
Uber) on the labor market in terms of labor force 
participation, unemployment rate, supply, and wage of 
low-skilled workers. Combining a data set of Uber entry 
time and several microdata sets, we utilize a difference-
in-differences (DID) method to investigate whether the 
above measures before and after Uber entry are 
significantly different across the U.S. metropolitan 
areas. Our empirical findings show that sharing 
economy platforms such as Uber significantly decrease 
the unemployment rate and increase the labor force 
participation. We also find evidence of a shift in the 
supply of low skill workers and consequently a higher 
wage rate for such workers in the traditional industries. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Sharing economy platforms leverage information 
technology (IT) to match the supply of underutilized 
assets or services (e.g., house, cars, labor) and the 
demand from individuals who are willing to pay for 
those assets or services in a real-time manner. Despite 
the controversy surrounding the sharing economy, its 
business models have disrupted many traditional 
industries and gained tremendous popularity over the 
last few years. One of the potential impacts of the 
sharing economy platforms is the labor market. 
According to McKinsey1, roughly 162 million people in 
the USA and the EU work in the sharing economy, 
equivalent to about 20% to 30% of the workforce. Katz 
                                                 
1 http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-
growth/independent-work-choice-necessity-and-the-gig-
economy 
and Krueger suggest that the net employment growth in 
the United States between 2005 and 2015 can be 
attributed to the rise in alternative work arrangements 
[24]. In this paper, we propose that there are two main 
mechanisms through which the sharing economy 
platforms can shape the labor market: the empowering 
effect and the substitution effect. 
First, the sharing economy is empowering millions 
of individuals to unlock the value of their time, skills 
and talents to make money in ways and on a scale not 
possible before. And the jobs within the sharing 
economy sectors tend to be flexible in terms of work 
schedule. Therefore, the sharing economy could provide 
individuals who cannot work nine-to-five jobs with a 
viable option to work. Besides, for individuals who 
cannot find traditional jobs in the competitive labor 
market, those jobs with low skill requirements and low 
entry barrier in the sharing economy may serve as viable 
choices.  
Second, besides flexibility, job opportunities in the 
sharing economy have other advantages over traditional 
jobs. For example, researchers find that Uber vehicles 
have higher occupancy rates than conventional cabs 
[16], a result attributable to Uber's advanced technology 
and efficient matching algorithm. Additionally, Hall and 
Krueger found that UberX drivers, the group most 
comparable to ordinary cab drivers, earned between 
$16.89 and $18.31 per hour depending on hours worked 
[23]. Therefore, individuals with low-paying jobs would 
be more likely to switch jobs and work in the sharing 
economy. This is what we call the substitution effect:  
sharing economy has the potential to decrease the labor 
supply in low-skill jobs. In response to the shift in the 
labor supply, the companies that provide low-skill jobs 
would have to increase their wages in order to be 
competitive in the labor market. 
To empirically examine these effects, we collected 
data from multiple sources. Specifically, we compiled a 
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unique data set combining Uber entry times (manually 
collected from a comprehensive search of media reports 
as well as complemented with data from Uber 
Research), employment data and position related data 
from publicly available data sources. We use a natural 
experiment approach to estimate the effect of Uber entry 
on the various labor outcomes. Since the time of Uber 
entry into various urban areas is different, we employ a 
multi-entry difference-in-differences (DID) method to 
investigate whether the outcome measures for labor 
participation, unemployment rate, supply and wage 
before and after Uber entry are significantly different 
across the metropolitan areas. We find that Uber's entry 
into a metropolitan statistical area (MSA)2 increases 
labor participation and decreases unemployment rates 
for that MSA. In addition, we observed empirical 
evidence that, after Uber's entry into a MSA, the wage 
for low-skill jobs increases, a result of the substitution 
effect. Overall, our study provides evidence of 
significant impacts of the platform-based sharing 
economy, in particular Uber's entry, on the labor market. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After 
reviewing relevant literature about the sharing economy 
and the labor market in Section 2, we develop our 
hypotheses in Section 3. Section 4 describes in detail the 
data and our econometric specifications. Section 5 
presents our findings as well as additional robustness 
checks. Section 6 summarizes and provide concluding 
remarks of the study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Sharing Economy 
 
There has been a long stream of research that 
examine the innovations of digital platforms in the IS 
literature [5,20,28]. The traditional two-sided platforms 
(such as eBay, Amazon) that facilitate transactions of 
physical products have slowly given way to the new 
sharing-based economy in recent years. Sundararajan 
argues that the sharing-based economy could potentially 
have significant social and economic implications [30], 
including the disruption of long-standing industries [27] 
and displacement of incumbents [13,21,31,33].  
There are also studies that have explored the various 
externality effects of such sharing economy platforms 
[18,21,32,33]. One interesting question is whether these 
digital platforms are simply introducing digital 
intermediaries or actually increasing the extent of the 
gig or contract work. Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, Handy, 
Freelancer, Upwork, and other platforms are 
transforming industries by connecting “producers” with 
                                                 
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metropolitan_statistical_area 
customers in new ways. In some cases, this is displacing 
or threatening existing, often regulated, service 
providers (such as taxis and hotels). In other cases, it is 
formalizing previously less organized or locally 
organized work. Therefore, there is an ongoing debate 
over whether the sharing economy creates or destroys 
jobs [25]. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of 
the first studies that seek to systematically examine the 
issue of the sharing economy and the labor market.  
 
2.2. Digital Innovation and Labor Market 
 
How information technologies are affecting the 
labor market is a classic research question in the 
literature. The rapid advancement of technology 
increases an economy’s productive capacity but does 
not benefit everyone in a society automatically [12]. 
Technology takes over tasks and destroys job which 
makes millions of people suffer. In the meantime, 
proliferation of new technologies can create 
employment opportunities. Bessen, for instance, 
demonstrated that the aggregate number of bank tellers 
increased despite the diffusion of automated teller 
machines [11]. Similarly, Basker et al. documented that 
employment per gasoline station increased between 
1977 and 1992, even as the share of stations with self-
service pumps expanded from 40 to 80 percent [8]. A 
growing body of work have examined how local labor 
markets adjust in response to the arrival of new 
technologies [2,9]. In particular, some studies [10,17] 
documented that computer technology has substituted 
for workers performing routine tasks, leading to 
downward pressure on employment and suppressed 
wages for routine jobs. Akerman et al. used variation in 
broadband availability across areas to examine the 
causal impact on the labor market outcomes for different 
types of workers [1]. In this paper, we argue that the 
sharing-based innovative business models offer workers 
some unique features (e.g., flexibility, convenience, and 
control over time and income) that could be both labor 
substituting (substitution effect) and labor augmenting 
(empowering effect), highlighting significant 
implications in the labor market. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development  
 
3.1. Participation and Unemployment 
 
With information technology, individuals gain new 
capabilities and channels to participate and express 
themselves in a networked society. This is called digital 
empowerment [26]. The sharing economy means 
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empowerment for a large number of people who can 
earn additional income from assets they already own; 
take control of their own work schedule and income; and 
do what’s best for their family. We expect it could 
increase labor participation in two ways. First, the 
sharing economy could encourage individuals to enter 
the labor force who otherwise would be left out. As 
discussed earlier, one important benefit the sharing 
economy provides is work flexibility, which empowers 
individuals (such as stay-at-home parents, retirees, 
students, people with disabilities) for whom the 
conventional routines of nine-to-five jobs aren't an 
option. Second, the sharing economy provides jobs for 
individuals who were in the labor force but got laid off. 
For those individuals, participation in contingent work 
may be their only option in a tough labor market. 
Therefore we make the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Uber's entry into a MSA increases 
labor force participation in the MSA. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Uber's entry into a MSA decreases 
unemployment rate in the MSA. 
 
3.2. Labor Supply and Wage 
 
The emergence and expansion of the sharing 
economy has fundamentally changed the traditional 
business models. Many papers have examined the 
impact of sharing economy on the respective same 
industry [7,19,31,33].  
In contrast to the existing literature, we adopt a 
cross-industry perspective in this paper. We argue that 
the sharing economy business models not only disrupt 
incumbent industry job opportunities, but also have a 
profound effect on traditional low-skill jobs in the 
industries. As discussed earlier, jobs in the new sharing 
economy are flexible, autonomous, and well paid. These 
relative advantages may attract individuals with low-
skill and/or low-paying jobs to switch to jobs in the 
sharing economy, thus causing a drop of labor supply 
for the low-skill jobs in traditional industries. In order to 
stay competitive, the companies that provide low-skill 
jobs would then need to increase their wages. Hence we 
make the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Uber's entry into a MSA attracts 
workers with low-skill jobs, thus decreases the total 
employment of those low-skill jobs in the MSA. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Uber's entry into a MSA leads to a 
shortage of labor supply for low-skill workers, thus 
firms would increase the wage to attract those workers 
in the MSA. 
 
4. Data and Methods  
 
We conduct two parts of analysis to test the 
hypotheses. Each part draws on different sources of data 
and different models. We will describe each part in two 
subsections following the independent variable and the 
econometric identification. 
 
4.1. Independent variable 
 
Since our analysis focuses on one specific sharing 
economy platform: Uber. So our variable of interest is a 
proxy for Uber effect. We operationalize the Uber effect 
to the entry time of Uber into a local area. This data was 
retrieved manually from major news media. This data 
contains Uber start date of four different Uber services 
(UberBlack, UberX, UberXL, and UberSUV) for 157 
areas. We use the earliest entry time for any service as 
the Uber entry time for this area 
 
4.2. Econometric identification 
 
We use a natural experiment approach to empirically 
examine the impact of Uber on the labor market within 
the United States. This research design offers us an 
important advantage: Since the time of Uber entry into 
various urban areas is different, we can use a multi-site 
entry difference-in-differences (DID) method to 
investigate whether the labor market measures before 
and after Uber entry are different across different urban 
areas [3]. This data structure further enables us to 
include location and time fixed effects, which 
effectively control for static heterogeneity across 
locations, as well as any unobserved temporal trends or 
shocks (e.g., seasonality). To be more specific, our 
model specification is given by Equation (1).     
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜆 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
                                    
In this equation, 𝑖 represents a metropolitan area, t is 
the time period, 𝜃𝑖 is the area fixed effects, 𝛾𝑡 is the time 
fixed effects, 𝛽 is the coefficient of Uber entry, 𝜆  are the 
coefficients for the control variables, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term. In this research, we conduct analysis at the 
metropolitan area level. Uber launches its service 
mostly in city level, only under a few circumstances, it 
enters a whole metropolitan area. But we choose the 
metropolitan area as the unit of analysis based on two 
reasons: first, Uber launches in one area means its 
service is legal (enters/launches) in this area, which only 
affects the pick-up. In this way, Uber drivers can drop 
someone off wherever they want, but the pick-up must 
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be in a legal territory. If an area is “illegal” the company 
will put a “blackout” or a “block” on it so no riders can 
request and no drivers can pick up.  The other but minor 
issue is that most dependent variables and control 
variables included in our models are only available at 
the metropolitan areas. We use the Uber entry time of 
the center city3 as the entry time for the corresponding 
metropolitan area. 
 
4.3. Labor Participation and Unemployment 
Rate 
 
We collect labor participation and unemployment 
rate data from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
(LAUS) program. The LAUS program produces 
monthly and annual employment, unemployment, and 
labor force data for census regions and divisions, States, 
counties, metropolitan areas, and many cities, by place 
of residence. We use monthly seasonally-adjusted data 
for MSA considering our research context and question. 
Since the earliest Uber entry time is 2011 into San 
Francisco. So we use data from January, 2008 to 
September, 2016 in order to balance the pre-treatment 
and post-treatment time periods. Since Uber enters into 
different cities at different points of time, we cannot find 
a perfectly balanced time window so that for each area, 
the number of pre-treatment periods exactly equals to 
the number of post-treatment periods. When collecting 
data, we try to make sure the area with earliest entry time 
has a few years’ pre-treatment periods and in this way, 
we make sure all areas have enough pre-treatment 
periods and post-treatment periods. Table 1 provides the 
summary statistics of the data set and the control 
variables included. The econometric model for testing 
hypothesis 1a and 1b is shown in Equation (2). 𝑖 
represents a metropolitan area, t is the time period, 𝜃𝑖 is 
the area fixed effects, 𝛾𝑡 is the time fixed effects, 𝛿 is the 
coefficient of Uber entry, 𝜆  are the coefficients for the 
control variables, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. For labor 
participation, we expect δ is significantly positive. For 
un-employment rate, we expect δ is significantly 
negative. 
 
𝐷𝑉(𝐿𝐴𝑈𝑆)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (2)                                                      
 
4.4. Supply and Wage of Low-Skill Workers 
 
We check our second hypothesis using data from 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). This 
program is conducted by Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), it produces employment and wage estimates 
                                                 
3 The center city of one metropolitan area is defined by the 
Census Bureau 
annually for over 800 occupations. The survey 
participants are exclusive “employees”. This data offers 
us two advantages: first, OES is employer/payroll 
survey, which is different from the household survey. 
For household survey, if a person did any work for pay 
or profit during the reference period (whether that be 
wage and salary employment, self-employment, 
independent contractors, etc.), she is counted as 
employed. So Uber driver would fall into this category. 
This is different than the employer/payroll surveys that 
count only those who were on employer payrolls during 
the reference period.  In that case, an independent 
contractor like an Uber driver would not be counted. So 
using the household survey, we can estimate the overall 
impact of Uber on labor participation and 
unemployment rate. With the employer/payroll survey, 
we can investigate the spillover effect of Uber on other 
traditional low-skill/low-income jobs. 
Second, BLS uses the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) code for all the position related 
data (include OES). The SOC system is used by Federal 
statistical agencies to classify workers and jobs into 
occupational categories for the purpose of collecting, 
calculating, analyzing, or disseminating data. We can 
use this code to connect the OES data with the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) data. The 
DOT data refers to a publication produced by the United 
States Department of Labor which helped employers, 
government officials, and workforce development 
professionals to define over 13,000 different types of 
work. The DOT was created by job analysts who visited 
thousands of US worksites to observe and record the 
various types of work, and what was involved. The data 
set provides intensity measures of different skills for 
occupations. Autor defined three measures: abstract, 
routine, and manual scores to represent the high, 
medium and low skill intensity of each job [4]. We adopt 
the “manual score” for each occupation in this research. 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the variables 
in this data set. 
The econometric model we use for this part is shown 
as in Equation (3). Specifically, we control for the MSA 
effect, time effect and MSA specific time trends. For 
wage, we expect the coefficient of Task Manual Score λ 
to be negative (for a job, the lower skill, the higher 
manual score and then the lower wage) and the 
coefficient of the interaction term β to be significantly 
positive. For total employment, we expect β to be 
significantly negative. 
 
Page 669
 5 
 
𝐷𝑉(𝑂𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛽 ∗ 𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗 + ∅ ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                 (3) 
 
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Unemployment Rate (%) 7.16 2.74 2.3 25.9 
Civilian Labor Force 633,859 1,137,815 43,554 1.02e+07 
GDP 67,710 143,965 2,620 1,412,183 
Minimum Wage($/hour) 7.51 0.65 2.65 11.5 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of LAUS data 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Annual Wage Mean annual wage 46,373.69 25,584.49 12,130 282,600 
Hourly Wage Mean hourly wage 22.35 12.30 5.87 135.87 
Tot Emp Total employment 1,275.54 4,028.82 30 230,910 
Task Abstract Task abstract score 3.03 2.34 0 9 
Task Routine Task routine score 4.20 2.23 1.19 8.64 
Task Manual Task manual score 1.12 1.30 0 6.17 
Table 2. Definition and Summary Statistics of OES data
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Effects on Labor Participation and 
Unemployment Rate 
 
5.1.1. Main Results. Table 3 describes the results of 
model (2). This is the model without control variables. 
The dependent variable “civilian labor force” is log 
transformed. Since the data is seasonally adjusted, so we 
use monthly fixed effect. We can see that the coefficient 
of Uber entry is significantly positive for labor force 
participation and significantly negative for the 
unemployment rate. And this results are consistent after 
including the control variables (GDP and minimum 
wage) as shown in Table 4. 
 
5.1.2. Alternative measure for Uber entry. So far, we 
have used Uber entry time to proxy for the 
implementation of Uber service. This approach has 
limitations. Specifically, after Uber service enters an 
urban area, it takes time for people to accept and get 
accustomed to this new service. Therefore, Uber entry 
may not represent the actual usage rate, and there may 
be a time lag between Uber entry and its impact on the 
traffic congestion. In order to alleviate this concern, we 
use an alternative measure of Uber Entry in 
metropolitan areas: the number of Uber searches in a 
metropolitan area on Google Trends. Google Trends is 
a publicly available web application based on Google 
Search. It provides us an index of the popularity of the 
sharing economy platform in a certain geographic 
region. Google Trends have been previously 
demonstrated to track economic activities (retail sales, 
automotive sales, home sales, and travel) in real time 
[15]. Wu and Brynjolfsson find that Google Trends are 
better in predicting housing sales and prices than 
traditional indicators [32].  
We used the Google Trends search history of the 
keyword combination “Uber” + “name of the urban 
area” to measure the popularity and the usage level of 
Uber in an urban area. It's reasonable to assume that 
when a person searches “Uber New York”, she is likely 
to be interested in the Uber service in the New York 
City. The correlation between Uber entry time and the 
search volume on Google is positive and significant. 
There is, however, a potential issue with the search 
volume on Google Trends. Before Uber actually entered 
an urban area, the search volume is generally not zero in 
most urban areas. The non-zero search volume could 
represent some expectations and curiosity but not the 
actual Uber usage. We address this problem by 
multiplying it with the Uber entry dummy variable as a 
new variable: Uber usage. Table 5 presents the results 
of our analysis using Uber usage. Once again, we find 
that our estimation results are robust to this alternative 
measure. 
 
5.2. Effects on the Supply and Wage of Low-
Skill Workers 
 
5.2.1. Main Results. Table 6 presents the results of the 
model (3). Column 3 is for hypothesis 2a. The 
coefficient of the interaction term for total employment 
is significantly negative. But for the Uber dummy 
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variable, the coefficient is not significant. It means that 
Uber has significant influence on the employment of 
low skill jobs. The lower skill the job needs (the higher 
the manual score), the lower employment, which 
supports the hypothesis 2a. This effect becomes more 
intuitive when we plot the marginal effect in figure 1(b). 
Uber entry increases some jobs' employment (task 
manual score is around 0), as the manual score increase, 
as the job becomes the lower skill, Uber entry 
significantly decreases employment of those jobs. 
Because of this short of labor supply for traditional low 
skill jobs. We expect the company has to increase the 
wage to attract enough labor force (hypothesis 2b), and 
this hypothesis has been checked according to the 
results. As shown in the first and second column (annual 
wage and hourly wage), the coefficients of Uber dummy 
are not significant, but for interaction terms are 
significantly positive. The increasing effect becomes 
obvious after interacting with occupation manual score. 
It means that Uber entry significantly increases the wage 
of low skill workers (higher manual score). As shown in 
figure 1(a) (figure for hourly wage omit for simplicity), 
the most important signal we can derive is: Uber entry 
has a significant effect on increasing the wage of low-
skill jobs, the lower the skill, the stronger the effect. We 
also try cluster robust standard errors for the three 
models. We find that the results are consistent. 
 
Dependent Variables Civilian Labor Force Unemployment Rate 
Uber Entry 0.023***(0.003) -2.396***(0.085) 
Constant 12.636***(0.001) 7.858***(0.029) 
Observations 17220 17220 
R-squared 0.117 0.305 
Area Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Number of MSAs 164 164 
       Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Default in the following tables) 
Table 3. Main Results of Model 2 using LAUS data 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables Civilian Labor Force Unemployment Rate 
Uber Entry 0.013***(0.003) -2.065***(0.116) 
GDP 8.05e-07*(3.37e-07) -0.000036(0.000019) 
Minimum Wage 0.003(0.003)       0.353*(0.171) 
Constant 12.570***(0.028) 7.658***(1.496) 
Observations 15648 15648 
R-square 0.114 0.230 
Area fixed effect Yes Yes 
Month fixed effect Yes Yes 
Number of MSAs 163 163 
Table 4. Main Results of Model 2 (with control variables) using LAUS data 
 
 
Dependent Variables Civilian Labor Force Unemployment Rate 
Uber Use 0.004***(0.001) -0.650***(0.039) 
GDP 7.12e-07*(3.24e-07) -0.000027(0.000017) 
Minimum Wage 0.003(0.003) 0.425*(0.193) 
Constant 12.736***(0.033) 6.702***(1.740) 
Observations 12480 12480 
R-square 0.134 0.263 
Area fixed effect Yes Yes 
Month fixed effect Yes Yes 
Number of MSAs 130 130 
Table 5. Main Results of Model 2 with Alternative Measures 
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Dependent Variables Annual Wage Hourly Wage Total Employment 
Uber Entry -0.0820(0.0711) -0.0874(0.0711) -0.135(0.171) 
Task Manual Score -0.0365***(0.000532) -0.0381***(0.000533) -0.00995***(0.00155) 
Uber * Task Manual Score 0.00588***(0.00129) 0.00596***(0.00129) -0.0206***(0.00374) 
 Constant 10.29***(0.0414) 2.654***(0.0414) 4.798***(0.0911) 
Observations 433,764 431,404 408,758 
R-squared 0.065 0.066 0.257 
Area specific trend Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard error Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6. Main Results Using OES data 
 
 
(a) Annual wage as DV                                        (b) Total Employment as DV 
 
Figure 1.  The marginal effect of Uber entry on the marginal effect of task manual score 
 
Dependent Variables Annual Wage Hourly Wage Total Employment 
Uber Use -0.0129 -0.501(1.293) -0.00447 
Task Manual Score -0.0367***(0.000594) -0.0382***(0.000595) -0.0113***(0.00174) 
Uber Use * Task Manual Score 0.00110***(0.000237) 0.00111***(0.000238) -0.00342***(0.000696) 
Constant 10.55***(0.0296) 2.911***(0.0297) 5.922***(0.0858) 
Observations 352,592 350,794 332,454 
R-squared 0.0273 0.0281 0.0070 
Area specific trend Yes Yes Yes 
Robust stand error Yes Yes Yes 
Table 7. Using Google Trend as the proxy for Uber entry 
 
(a) Annual wage as DV                                          (b) Total employment as DV 
 
Figure 2. The marginal effect of Uber use on the marginal effect of task manual score (alternative measure)  
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5.2.2. Alternative measure for Uber entry. As before, 
we use google trend multiplied by Uber entry dummy to 
serve as an alternative measure for Uber entry. The 
estimates are presented in Table 7; the marginal effects 
are displayed in Figure 2. Overall, our model is 
consistent using the alternative measures. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Sharing economy is changing the employment 
landscapes. Rigorous research has been called to 
quantify the impacts. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is one of the first studies to systematically analyze the 
effect of sharing economy on the labor market. 
To the degree that much of this work is designed to 
inform policy, either through a change in the broad 
understanding of digital phenomena [13,21,22], or by 
highlighting the differential effects which accrue to 
different groups [29], our work highlights the need to 
continue down the important path of providing robust 
empirical evidence which informs extant debate. 
Besides, this paper also adds some insights about the 
impact of digital innovation on the labor market. 
Sharing economy platforms have experienced a 
meteoric rise in recent years, and are projected to grow 
rapidly in the near future. This trend has been the latest 
and non-negligible revolution. Findings of the how this 
new form of business model based on digital innovation 
influences labor participation and workers can be a 
significant contribution to this research area.  
This research also has significant practical 
implications. It provides some positive evidence on 
sharing economy platforms, which will either informs 
the extant debate or informs policy makers. Our rigorous 
empirical analysis provides additional evidence that 
sharing economy platforms could actually be part of a 
solution to unemployment in metropolitan areas. The 
expansion of sharing economy faces tremendous 
challenges over the last few years. As discussed earlier, 
many cities have either banned or forced Uber to close 
down their business due to various concerns. Our results 
show that policymakers should also look at the positive 
side(s) of the sharing economy in order to make 
informed decisions.  
This work is, of course, subject to a number of 
limitations, which offer potentially fruitful avenues for 
future work. First, as mentioned above, this paper focus 
on one sharing economy platform: Uber. Uber has its 
uniqueness and specialty comparing to other sharing 
economy platforms. Since the impacts on the labor 
market are based on the nature and characteristics of the 
jobs. So our findings may not directly apply to other 
sharing platforms without further consideration. 
Additionally, because the sharing economy is a 
relatively new phenomenon, we are unable to examine 
the longer term consequences of Uber's entry on the 
labor market. Future work using more extended panel 
data is worth to pursue. 
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